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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether entitlement to a jury instruction on the statute of limitations was 
waived by Respondent's failure to submit a legally correct instruction. 
2. Whether Petitioner demonstrated an exception to the "presence" rule for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
3. Whether a "willful act" was properly pled as part of Petitioner's claim 
for abuse of process. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the appellate court's 
application of the law for correctness. Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon. 61 
P.3d 1009 (Utah 2002). The decision of the appellate court is reviewed, not that of the 
trial court. Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration. 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997). 
When the appellant does not attack the trial court's factual findings, but 
instead contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law, the appellant is not required 
to marshal the evidence. Challenges to legal determinations do not require the marshaling 
of evidence.1 Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991). 
The three above legal determinations, upon which certiorari was granted in 
this case, do not challenge the evidence to any factual findings made by the trial court; 
therefore, the marshaling of evidence, or a full transcript, is not required. Furthermore, 
the sufficiency of evidence was not an issue for which certiorari was granted in this case. 
furthermore, Rule 11(e)(2) only requires a transcript of all evidence in support of 
a finding or conclusion to argue on appeal that such finding or conclusion was either 
unsupported or contrary to the evidence. It does not require a transcript to challenge the 
trial court's rulings on the law. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceedings 
At a special public hearing, the Town's building program was being 
discussed. Hatch was being denied a building license, as well as other business licenses 
by the Town. The Town's building program was being illegally operated. (Rec. 1-3) 
During this meeting, Davis, the husband of the Town Clerk, Judith Davis pushed Hatch 
up against some chairs and threatened his life. As a result of these actions, Hatch filed a 
federal civil rights suit (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against the Town of Boulder (Rec. 10-24) and 
also against Davis for the assault and battery occurring at the public hearing. (Rec. 22-23) 
Larry Davis filed a motion to be dismissed from the federal action based on 
jurisdictional grounds and the fact that he claimed it was not a public hearing. The 
minutes from the meeting, kept by Davis's wife, Town Clerk Judith Davis, were 
submitted to argue that a public hearing was not being held during this time.2 
Based on these minutes, the federal court did not find a common nexus with 
the federal claims and Davis was dismissed from the federal lawsuit on March 17, 1997. 
(Rec. 110-112) Davis sought attorneys fees incurred in defending the action in federal 
court, which were denied. Hatch went on to prevail against the Town in the federal 
lawsuit and was awarded $86,000.00, plus attorneys fees. (Rec. 397-398). 
2At trial in this case, Judith Davis admitted that there was indeed a public hearing 
during the recess of the Town Meeting and that the recess was taken specifically to hold a 
public hearing on the building inspection program. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 330-335) 
2 
On March 16,1998, within a year of Davis's dismissal from the federal 
lawsuit, Hatch filed his assault and battery claim against Davis in Garfield County. (Rec. 
1-3) Davis filed an Answer and Counterclaim on July 21,1998, alleging Abuse of 
Process and Malicious Prosecution. These claims were based on Hatch's re-filing of the 
lawsuit in state court after its dismissal from federal court. (Rec. 4-24) The basis of 
Davis's claims was that the action was brought, "without any hope of success and to 
intimidate the residents of the town as well as the town council to comply with Hatch 9s 
narrow and peculiar political and philosophical positions." (Rec. 5-6). 
On August 11, 1998, Hatch filed a Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim on 
grounds that all of the elements, including termination of the initial proceeding in favor of 
Davis, had not been met in order to state such claims. (Rec. 25). Before the court ruled 
on Hatch's Motion to Dismiss, Davis filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim on 
May 6,1999, including two additional actions, for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress and for Attorney's Fees, based on Utah's bad faith statute. (Rec. 60) On May 
20,1999, Hatch filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Counterclaim, again based on the 
grounds that all of the elements, including termination of the initial proceeding in favor of 
Davis, had not been satisfied to state such a claim. (Rec. 50). 
On October 14, 1999, the trial court denied Hatch's Motion to Dismiss the 
Amended Counterclaim (although Davis never filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
second Motion to Dismiss, the trial court treated the first response as if it had been filed 
to the later Motion to Dismiss, Rec. 178-179). The basis of the court's ruling was that the 
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termination of the underlying action was not a prerequisite and that "this case appears to 
be in the 'unusual' category." Relying on the language in Baird v. Intermountain School 
Fed. Credit Union. 555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976). (Rec. 33, 178-179). 
The parties proceeded with discovery and Hatch's counsel deposed Davis 
and asked him what specific facts constituted Abuse of Process or Malicious Prosecution, 
to which he responded the re-filing of the lawsuit in state court after it was dismissed in 
federal court; and that the claims made against him were untxue. (Rec. 299-300, 324) The 
emotional distress dealt with Hatch's dealings with Davis's wife in the federal lawsuit 
(which Hatch won), and complaints and requests for information, that Hatch had written 
to the Utah State Park Department and other governmental officials, regarding the 
operation of Anasazi State Park from 1990 to 1993. (Rec. 307, 322). 
Hatch filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 27, 2001, again 
claiming that the elements for Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution had not been 
met; and that the facts testified to by Davis in his deposition were not sufficient to support 
these claims. Hatch also sought dismissal of the Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress claim, since the letters he had written to his governmental representatives, could 
not be deemed "outrageous conduct," under an objective standard, and Davis did not 
suffer any severe emotional distress. Hatch also claimed that the letter writing occurred 
over four years ago, and was thus, barred by the four year statute of limitations § 78-12-
25(3) U.C.A.; and any claim based on Hatch's dealing with Judith Davis is baseless (she 
never testified of distress); and Hatch's dealings with Judith Davis cannot be grounds for 
4 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, since Hatch had a right to complain, as 
evidence by his victory in the federal lawsuit; and would be barred anyway by the 
<(presence requirement, " since Mr. Davis was not present when any alleged conduct took 
place. Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 46(b)(2). (Hatch's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment is located at Rec. 281-454). 
The court denied Hatch's Motion for Summary Judgment ruling that the 
filing of the 1996 lawsuit may constitute an act of wrongful use of civil proceeding, 
stating that "wrongful use of civil proceedings "means to sue someone without a good 
reason and lose the lawsuit"(Rec. 587-589) The court then goes on with an analysis of 
"ex parte" proceedings, when there was no question regarding any ex parte proceedings 
presented in the case. (Rec. 588) This is contained in the court's Order of July 5, 2001. 
(Rec. 587-589). In July 2001, after receiving this ruling, Hatch filed a Petition for an 
Interlocutory Appeal, feeling that he should not be required to proceed in this matter 
when these claims should have been dismissed. (Rec. 591) This Petition was denied on 
September 12,2001. (Rec. 613). The presence of these claims prejudiced Hatch on his 
assault and battery claims at trial.3 
A Scheduling Order was entered on January 2, 2002, setting trial for April 
2nd, 3rd ,4th and 5th. (Rec. 625-626) Hatch filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge David L. 
3Rather than finding a lack of probable cause to bring the claims under a legal 
determination, the jury found against Hatch on a preponderance of the evidence standard 
on his assault and battery claim, and then based on that standard, improperly found abuse 
of process. 
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Mower from presiding in the case.4 On January 31, 2002, Judge David L. Mower recused 
himself from the case. (Rec. 647). On February 20, 2002, Hatch filed a Motion in Limine 
to exclude any expert's testimony; any correspondence with Davis's wife, when Mr. 
Davis was not present; and any letters written by Hatch to government or state officials. 
(Rec. 654-659). 
At the March 11, 2002 Pre-trial Conference, Hatch requested Judge Mclff 
to go back and review Judge Mower's previous rulings, including the court's refusal to 
dismiss the Counterclaims. The court indicated that it would not go back and review any 
previous decisions. (Rec. 670). 
The matter was tried to a jury on April 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 9th 2002. At 
the time of trial counsel for Hatch submitted specific jury instructions outlining the 
necessary elements of his claims and defenses available to Hatch on the Counterclaims. 
(Rec. 676-695)5 Hatch's Jury Instruction for Malicious Prosecution, contained the 3 
elements, including the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused. (Rec. 679, 
File 4). Hatch's Jury Instruction for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress included 
the (tpresence " requirement when the conduct is directed to a third person (Rec. 681, File 
4In a previous lawsuit Hatch v. Town of Boulder, App.Case.No. 20000189-CA, 
Judge Mower had found Hatch in bad faith awarding attorneys fees against Hatch, which 
was overturned by this Court, then after remand failed to enter an order for Hatch's costs 
on appeal. 
5Pages 670-699 are repeated twice in the Record. The jury instructions are located, 
as the second set, in File 4 of the Record. 
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4), and Utah's Four Year Statute of Limitations period for Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress. (Rec. 695, File 4). 
At trial, witness Lynne Mitchell, testified that she was at the Town Meeting 
and she saw Davis push Hatch, "Larry (Davis) came over to him (Hatch), pushed him 
against some desks, bellied up to him." "He bellied right up to him and backed him into 
the - - into the desks." (Trans. Vol. 1. pg. I l l) She further testified that Ms. Davis had to 
come and wedge herself between Larry (Davis) and Julian (Hatch) at which point Julian 
was able to get away; and that Larry continued to follow Julian and that she had to step in 
between the two of them to keep Davis from following Hatch. She further testified that 
Davis continued to provoke them after the meeting. She also filed a letter with the police 
regarding the incident. (Trans. Vol. 1. pg. 112-113). 
Hatch testified at trial that a few years before the Town Meeting, he had 
been physically accosted by Davis when he reached into Hatch's vehicle, grabbed Hatch 
by the shoulder and began to shake him and told him "I'm going to get you." (Trans. Vol. 
II. pg. 420, 421). At the Town Meeting Hatch testified that Davis "pushed into me with 
his belly - - did not push with his hands - - he just came and bellied up to me." (Trans. 
Vol. II. pg 434). Hatch testified that he was pushed up against the back of some desks 
and pinned, "No, I could not move at all. I could have pushed my way out, I guess. I was 
against the desks on my back." (Trans. Vol. II. pg. 435). Hatch further testified that his 
life was threatened when Davis said "You're dead." (Trans. Vol. II. pg. 435). Hatch, is 
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not a violent person, and was concerned for his safely, based on his past experiences with 
Davis and Davis's training at POST as a police officer. (Trans. Vol. II. pg 435). 
The Police Report of Monte Luker was also admitted into evidence at the 
trial. (Plaintiffs Ex.80) It contained statements from Hatch that he was pushed; and 
statements from other witnesses that Davis was 2-3 inches from Hatch's face, and that 
Davis's statements were very threatening and his demeanor was extremely 
confrontational, hostile and intimidating; and Davis beckoned Hatch to come over and 
fight. (Plaintiffs Ex. 80). 
At the end of Hatch's evidence Davis moved for dismissal, which was 
denied by the court.(Rec. 719) The court found, that there was a factual issue presented 
on the assault and battery claims, sufficient for the jury. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 540-542, 712). 
During Davis's case, Davis testified that he was the manager of Anazasi 
State Park near Boulder, Utah. As manager had lengthy discussions with Hatch regarding 
an Indian burial display. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 600). Davis told Hatch that he would remove 
the display at the Park. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 601). The display was not removed. Hatch 
raised other complaints about the Park. Hatch wrote as an officer of the Boulder 
Regional Group, Davis personalized the matter by writing back to Hatch as an individual. 
Davis further invited Hatch to write with his complaints, stating "we can't fix what we 
don't know about." (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 253) Davis was aware that Hatch met with 
Director Miller in Salt Lake in 1990 (Trans. Vol .1, pg. 259) Davis did not remember a 
specific call from Director Miller (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 260) Davis stipulated that the burial 
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issue was a legitimate concern. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 270) Davis testified that a letter was 
written by Hatch claiming that Davis was rude and acted in an "unprofessional manner, 
lost his temper, swearing, pounding his fists, yelling." Davis admitted that he got angry 
with Hatch, and that dealing with Hatch was frustrating.(Trans. Vol. II. pg 606) Davis 
admitted that he lost his cool with Hatch and apologized to the Division. (Trans. Vol. II, 
pg. 620) Davis testified that he was concerned about his employment at that time, 
because Hatch went up the chain of command with his complaints about the Park (Trans. 
Vol. II, pg. 621), but Davis also testified that he referred Hatch to Mr. Dyckman (Trans. 
Vol I, pg. 273-274); and that Hatch had the right to write letters to his supervisors. (Trans. 
Vol. II, pg. 651); and that he had an opportunity to respond to all the questions posed by 
Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 608-609) Davis's job at the Park was never in jeopardy as a 
result of any letters or actions taken by Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 650-651). Davis 
testified to this, and his employment filed did not mention Hatch at all.6 
Davis admitted, that at the Town Meeting, he was the one who got up out of 
his seat and came over to Hatch, and confronted him, at least saying "if you have 
something to say to me, you ought to be man enough to say it to my face" (Trans. Vol. II, 
pg. 631-632). Davis denied he said "your dead," and claims that he remained at arms 
length, without touching Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 633). The issue at the Town Meeting 
was about the legality of the Town's building inspection program, Hatch wanted to 
6Judge Mclff and counsel for both parties reviewed Davis's employment file and 
no one could find any mention of Hatch, his letters or his complaints. 
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eliminate it and Davis wanted to keep it. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 343). Other people in town 
raised the same issues. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 306) Hatch was being denied building permits, 
by Davis's friend Randy Catmull (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 298). 
Davis did not suffer any actual damages on his Counterclaims only 
emotional distress, from headaches, sometimes an upset stomach, and occasional 
insomnia. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 652). Davis also presented testimony by an expert witness 
regarding his emotional distress, which contained reports and other facts not contained in 
Davis's deposition. These reports were never disclosed to Hatch's counsel as ordered by 
the court at the Pre-Trial Conference. These reports also contained interviews conducted 
in February, a month before trial after the discovery period had expired. Hatch's counsel 
objected to this testimony, as this information was not provided as ordered by the court at 
the Pre-Trial Conference. The court denied the objections. (Rec. 719). 
The court also allowed testimony regarding Hatch's dealings with Davis's 
wife, Judith Davis, who was the Town Clerk for Boulder. These dealings were out of Mr. 
Davis's presence and had nothing to do with Mr. Davis, but Hatch's dealings with the 
Town of Boulder. Under the Town's ordinances, it was the Clerk's responsibility to 
issue the licenses Hatch was requesting. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 624-626) Hatch had already 
prevailed on these issues in the federal court action. (Rec. 397-398). Furthermore, at trial 
counsel for Davis stipulated that Judith Davis made mistakes as the Town Clerk. (Trans. 
Vol. I, pg. 326). It was Hatch's dealings with Mr. Davis's wife, out of his presence, 
which was the basis for his emotional distress claim. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 654). 
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At the end of Davis's evidence, Hatch again sought the dismissal of the 
Counterclaims as the evidence was insufficient to support the claims. Furthermore, the 
court had already found, at the end of Hatch's case-in-chief, that there was a sufficient 
basis to find probable cause on Hatch's assault and battery claims to go to the jury. 
Therefore bringing the assault and battery claims could not be deemed either as malicious 
prosecution, or an abuse of process by the jury, when both are based on a lack of probable 
cause. The court denied Hatch's motion stating: (Trans. Vol. II, pg 712) 
My view of the Motion is the same view I have with respect to the 
motion Mr. Bradshaw made at the conclusion of your case, when he asked 
that I dismiss the assault and battery claims. I'm satisfied that there are 
differing versions on all of these issues and that the jury is going to have to 
determine who it believes, what it believes, and that there is room within 
the evidence that has been admitted for the jury to reach either 
conclusion with respect to all claims. I find there's room for a reasonable 
jury to conclude that assault and battery, or at least assault - - battery may be 
a different story. But if Mr. Hatch is believed and Ms. Mitchell is 
believed, it could find both assault and battery. 
After four days of trial and a long weekend, on Tuesday April 9th, the court 
in chambers told counsel that he was going to dismiss the Malicious Prosecution and 
Abuse of Process claims, based on the court's review of the file and the jury instructions. 
Counsel for Davis strenuously objected to such a dismissal and objected to any 
communication to the jury by the court that these claims were being dismissed, as this 
would undoubtedly weaken his case. Hatch's counsel insisted that the jury be told that 
the claims were being dismissed by the court. The trial court in an attempt to reach a 
middle ground, dismissed the Malicious Prosecution claim, without telling the jury, and 
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left in the Abuse of Process claim, although the court did indicate, at the time, that it 
wasn't sure if this could even be allowed and that it may disallow it later, or may refuse to 
certify any verdict rendered on the Abuse of Process claim by the jury. The parties then 
stipulated that only attorneys fees were being sought as damages on the Abuse of Process 
claim and that the amount and propriety of attorneys fees would be determined at a later 
time. (See the second paragraph of the court's Post Verdict Ruling and Clarification, 
dated April 16,2002, Rec. 782). 
Hatch was not allowed to give proper jury instructions regarding the 
"presence" requirement on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Furthermore, evidence was allowed of conduct that occurred well beyond the four-year 
statute of limitation period, and Hatch was not allowed to give a jury instruction regarding 
the four-year statute of limitation period for the jury to consider. (Although Davis had 
earlier argued that this was a factual matter for the jury to decide in opposition to Hatch's 
earlier Motion for Summary Judgment. Rec. 483-484). 
The jury instruction allowing Hatch to petition his government and write to 
governmental leaders, was improperly limited, so as not to include any conduct which 
may satisfy the definition of "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress." (Rec. 746) 
The court also improperly instructed the jury on the Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress and on the Abuse of Process claim (Rec. 743-746), not deciding the 
difference, or which claim applied, until after trial. (Rec. 782-794). 
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After four days of trial, the jury was never informed of the court's ruling 
and the dismissal of the Malicious Prosecution claim. Hatch was prejudiced by the 
Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process claims being asserted against him on his 
claims. The jury found no cause of action on Hatch's Assault and Battery claim, and then 
found for Davis on his claim for Abuse of Process and awarded $75,000.00, although 
only $55,000.00 was ever presented in evidence, or claimed by Davis; and the parties had 
already stipulated that any recovery would be limited to attorneys fees, and would be later 
determined by the court. This also prejudiced Hatch. Such prejudice is evident from the 
jury's awarded of $75,000.00 without any evidence to support it. Furthermore, the jury 
awarded $87,000.00 on Davis's claim of Infliction of Emotional Distress, although no 
actual damages were alleged or incurred, or any basis given for the $87,000.00 amount.7 
(Rec. 750-753). 
After trial, the court requested the parties to submit additional memoranda 
dealing with the Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process claims, and whether the 
court could proceed with the Abuse of Process claim after dismissing the Malicious 
Prosecution claim. The court ruled on April 16,2002 that the Malicious Prosecution 
claim should not have gone to the jury and that this case did not present any "unusual" 
circumstance as referred by the Utah Supreme Court in Baird v. Intermountain School 
7The amount of this award can only be based on the fact that evidence came in that 
Hatch had received an $86,000.00 award earlier against the Town in the federal lawsuit 
for the violation of his civil rights. The jury in this case was not acting on evidence, but 
solely prejudice against Hatch. 
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Fed. Credit Union. 555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976), contrary to the prior rulings by Judge 
Mower, from which Hatch had sought an interlocutory appeal, and that this claim should 
not have gone to the jury. (Rec. 785-787) However, the court allowed the Abuse of 
Process claim to remain in spite of the clear language by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Winters v. Schulman. 979 P.2d 1218 (Ut.App. 1999) and Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Ut.App. 1989) stating that an "abuse of process claim requires 
that the prior proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they were 
brought." 977 P.2d at 1255. The trial court found that Davis could proceed with his 
Abuse of Process claim and that prior termination was not required. (Rec. 789-790) 
However, the trial court could not allow the $75,000.00 damage award on the Abuse of 
Process claim to stand, since there was no evidence of this presented to the jury. (Rec. 
790) The court further ruled that since there was not a single act of outrageous conduct, 
"but a practice of acts tolerable by themselves\ " the statute of limitations issue was not a 
legitimate issue for the jury to consider. (Rec. 798). 
On April 11, 2002, before any Judgment was rendered in the case, the trial 
court, relying on Rule 69(q) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure entered an Order 
Precluding Plaintiffs Transfer or Encumbrance of Property with a value greater than 
$500.00. (Rec. 756-757) Counsel for Hatch was contacted by telephone and objected to 
such an order, since a judgment had not been entered, and Paile 69(q) did not provide for 
such an order against Hatch. Hatch's counsel requested personal service of the Order on 
Hatch before it became effective. This was agreed to by Davis's counsel, but the Order 
.. • 14 : ' . . . . 
was never personally served on Hatch. Finally, after the court issued its Post Verdict 
Ruling and Clarification (Rec. 782-795), the court entered a Partial Judgment in the 
amount of $87,000.00. (Rec. 796). The Partial Judgment provides that it, "does not 
resolve all the issues raised between the parties in the suit, the time for appeal shall not 
commence to run until a final judgment is entered that fully concludes the litigation." 
(Rec. 796). 
On or about April 29,2002, Hatch filed a Motion to Set Aside the Verdict 
on Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Rec. 825-833), and a Motion for New 
Trial; or in the alternative a Remittitur on the Amount of Damages. (Rec. 834-846). 
On May 14,2002, before a final judgment was entered, the trial court issued 
a Writ of Garnishment on an exempt IRA account, which was taken (Rec. 855-857), a 
copy of the Writ was never sent to Hatch's counsel; and on July 18, 2002, the trial court 
further issued an Order in Supplemental Proceedings again before a final judgment was 
entered. This Order was also never personally served on Hatch, but a copy was sent to 
Hatch's counsel, who objected to it as being premature and filed a Motion to Quash the 
Order. Hatch also filed a Motion to Vacate the Order Precluding Plaintiffs Transfer or 
Encumbrance of Property. (Rec. 813-824). 
On June 9, 2002, the court denied two pending motions, the Motion to 
Vacate Order and the Motion for New Trial.(914-919) On September 5,2002, the trial 
court held an evidentiary hearing on the outstanding issues and the attorneys fees as 
damages on the Abuse of Process claim. The attorneys fees were reduced to $43,542.93 
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and final judgment was entered on September 5, 2002. (Rec. 1044-1047, 1059-1062) A 
Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings was issued that day. (Rec. 1065-1067) 
Hatch's Notice of Appeal was filed on September 17, 2002. (Rec. 1054-1055). 
Statement of the Facts 
1. At trial Lynne Mitchell testified that she was at the public hearing and that 
she witnessed Davis push Hatch up against some desks. She further testified that she had 
to wedge herself between Davis and Hatch, so Hatch could get away and that Davis 
continued to follow Hatch, provoking him to fight. (Trans. Vol. I. pg 111-113). 
2. Hatch testified at trial, that he had been grabbed and threatened before by 
Davis(Trans. Vol. II, pg. 420-421) and that at the public hearing Davis pushed him back 
against some desks so Hatch couldn't move, and among other things told Hatch "You're 
dead." (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 435). 
3. Hatch testified that he was in fear for his safety, as a result of Davis's 
actions at the public hearing; Davis's previous actions towards Hatch; and the fact that 
Davis had been trained in physical combat at POST as a police officer. (Trans. Vol. II, 
pg. 435). 
4. The Police Report of Monte Luker, admitted into evidence, also contains 
statements from Hatch that he was pushed; and statements from other witnesses stating 
that Davis's face was 2-3 inches from Hatch's face, that Davis's statements were very 
threatening and his demeanor extremely confrontational, hostile and intimidating; and that 
Davis beckoned Hatch to come over and fight. (Plaintiffs Ex. 80). 
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5. Davis testified that he had lengthy discussions with Hatch in the past (1989-
1990) about an Indian burial display. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 600). Davis told Hatch that the 
display would be removed. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 601). The display was not removed, when 
promised; and Hatch raised more questions about the Park. Davis invited Hatch to write 
with his complaints, stating "we can't fix what we don't know about." (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 
253). 
6. Hatch raised legitimate issues in his letters, such as the adequacy of the 
facilities at the State Park to house such a burial display. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 270). Hatch 
was referred to Davis's supervisors by Davis himself. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 273). 
7. Davis testified that he received a call from a division director or someone 
(not sure who) wanting an explanation of what's going on." (Trans. Vol. II, pg 603) 
Davis did not remember a specific call from his supervisor. (Trans. Vol. II. pg. 604). 
This occurred back in March of 1990. (Trans. Vol. II. pg. 605). 
8. Hatch did not make any threats to Davis but only questioned the operation 
of the Park and that the burial display be removed from the Park. Davis found Hatch to 
be a very demanding person. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 257). Davis didn't immediately respond 
to Hatch because of his demanding attitude. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 258). 
9. Hatch wrote letters to Utah State Park directors and Governor Bangetor 
about the Indian burial display and the display, met with Director Miller in Salt Lake City, 
and the display was finally removed. This occurred back in June of 1990. (Trans. Vol. I, 
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pg. 263). Davis testified that he was planning to remove the burial display anyway, 
regardless of any action from Hatch. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 261-262,266). 
10. At trial Davis produced letters written by Hatch, although Davis did not 
know or testify as to what was contained in each of these letters. (These letter are 
contained in a book of exhibits, identified as Defendant's Exhibit 103). A letter written 
by Hatch in March of 1990, claimed that Davis was rude and acted in an "unprofessional 
manner, lost his temper, swearing, pounding his fists, yelling." Hatch further states, "I 
believe that State Parks need to be aware of this behavior and ought to see that it does not 
happen to me or anyone else in the future. An investigation should be conducted into the 
policies and unprofessional behavior of theses [sic] persons. I would like a written 
apology from Supt. Davis concerning his derogatory and adversarial letter to me." (See 
Def s Ex. 103, tab 6,2nd page). At trial, Davis admitted that he got angry with Hatch at 
times, and that dealing with Hatch was frustrating. (Trans. Vol. II. pg 606). 
11. On April 29,1990 a letter was written by Hatch, not to Davis, but to Jerry 
A. Miller, regarding Mr. Miller's failure to answer Hatch's questions regarding the Park 
in a competent manner. Hatch states in the letter, "I will no longer wait and expect a 
decent reply to my concerns and I hereby 'wash my hands' of you and your flunky 
employees at State Parks." Hatch further writes, "the one glaring problem is with Jerry 
Miller, Larry Davis, and Anazasi State Park. It appears obvious to me who needs to be 
forced to obey the law and the problem will quickly be mended." The law is referring to 
the proper burial of Native American Indian remains. (Def s Ex. 103, tab 8). 
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12. On March 13,1992, a letter was written to Davis, asking seven (7) specific 
questions about the Indian burial (Def s Ex. 103, tab 11). This was not responded to by 
Davis. On April 20,1992, Hatch wrote a letter to Jerry Miller, not Davis, stating that Mr. 
Davis had failed to answer his questions and that Davis still continues to fight respectful 
actions towards the Anazasi Human remains and material goods, with which he has been 
entrusted. It appears by this hostile reply that Mr. Davis is not desirous of reinterment 
[sic] but is not courageous enough to say so." Finally Hatch concludes his letter stating, 
"Mr. Davis is not the correct person to lead Anasazi State Park in efforts to deal with the 
public in an equitable and considerate way. He appears to be too emotionally attached to 
the old Anazasi St. Pk. After twenty something years. We need someone to replace Mr. 
Davis and stop the continued abuses and problems which plague Anazasi Park." (Def s 
Ex. 103, tab 13). 
13. Julian also wrote of the incident in front of the Post Office on June 2,1992, 
when he was physically accosted by Mr. Davis. (Def s Ex. 103, tab 16) At trial, Davis 
admitted that he lost his cool with Hatch, at this time; and apologized to the Division for 
the incident. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 620). 
14. The next letter from Hatch was not to Davis, but to Governor Bangerter in 
June of 1992. Hatch in this letter asked for an investigation into the Division of State 
Parks due to problems with Park Manager Larry Davis and Director Jerry Miller. (Def s 
Ex. 103, tab 19). 
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15. The letters after this were not sent to Davis, but to Steven Roberts, 
regarding the free, or preferential, use of the Park by Boulder Outdoor Survival School 
("BOSS"), owned by personal friends of Davis. (Def s Ex. 103, tab 27). As far as Mr. 
Davis, the letter states, "until my complaints about BOSS occupying space at the park 
were made to Park Manager Larry Davis on March 8, 1990, after his request in writing 
for me to do so, the Division of Sate [sicj Parks didn't even have a lease contract with 
BOSS. Evidently, Mr. Davis quickly got a lease beginning May 1, 1990 but for many 
years the law was broken because he just let them move their trailers and personnel onto 
the park without any contract. The Free-ride for Mr. Davis's personal friends must end 
and I ask that you suspend and end this lease on April 30, 1993." (Def s Ex. 103, tab 27). 
The following letters simply sought infoirmation regarding BOSS'S operation on the Park. 
(Defs Ex. 103, tabs 29,30,32). 
16. At trial Davis testified that his job was never threatened by any letter or 
complaint from Hatch. He testified that he was concerned about his employment, but 
only because Hatch went up the chain of command with his complaints about the Park. 
(Trans. Vol. II, pg. 621). However, Davis also testified that Hatch had the right to write 
letters to his supervisors regarding legitimate issues at the Park (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 651); 
and that he (Mr. Davis) had an opportunity to respond to all the issues raised by Hatch. 
(Trans. Vol. II, pg. 608-609). 
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17. Davis's job at the Park was never in jeopardy as a result of any letters or 
actions taken by Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 650-651). Davis never received any letter, or 
notice, or any indication that his job was put in jeopardy as a result of any letter or action 
taken by Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 650-651) 
18. As Davis testified the letters do not say that Davis should be fired from the 
Park Service or that he is corrupt, but that "an investigation should be conducted into the 
policies and unprofessional behavior of these persons." (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 607, 619). 
Davis testified, that as a result of these letters, he had to answer questions and respond to 
phone calls. This started in 1990, and lasted between 1990 and 1992. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 
607,651). 
19. Davis admitted, that at the public hearing, he was the one who got up 
walked over to Hatch and confronted him, and at least said to Hatch "if you have 
something to say to me, you ought to be man enough to say it to my face" (Trans. Vol. II, 
pg. 631-632). Davis denied he said "your dead," and he claimed that he remained at arms 
length, without touching Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 633). 
20. The building inspector, Randy Catmull, was a friend of Davis, and Davis 
felt as though the town was feeding on him like a bunch of hungry sharks, (Trans. Vol. I, 
pg. 300) and that by voting to eliminate the building inspection program the Town was 
letting "Julian win again." Davis was also upset with Hatch over the issue of Town 
prayer. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 299, 302; letter to Joel Greer, Pit's Ex. 56). 
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21. Davis did not testify of any conduct taken by Hatch against his wife, Judith 
Davis, while in his presence. Davis simply testified that he eventually learned that Hatch 
asked for an investigation into her services as postmistress. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 624). 
22. As far as emotional distress, Davis testified that he has thought about Hatch 
over the past 11-12 years and his life has been less enjoyable. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 636-
637). He sometimes gets upset stomachs, headaches, and wakes up at night; however he 
never saw a health care professional regarding his symptoms. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 653-
655). These symptoms appeared right after the incidents occurred in the early 90s. 
(Trans.Vol.I,pg.352). 
23. Judith Davis testified that she couldn't think of anything outrageous or 
intolerable that was done against her by Hatch and she has never been fearful of Hatch. 
(Trans. Vol. I, pg. 340-341). Although Mr. Davis claims emotional distress through his 
wife, Judith Davis, she did not bring any claims against Hatch for Infliction of Emotional 
Distress or any other claims asserted in Davis's Counterclaim. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 340-
341). Judith Davis testified that she has not seen any letters written by Hatch accusing 
her of any malfeasance, and she doesn't know of any action taken against her as a result 
of any complaints made by Hatch. (Trans. Vol. I, pg 354). 
24. Judith Davis also testified that Hatch's effect on Davis was high blood 
pressure, indigestion, and inability to concentrate at times. Davis did not seek any help or 
medicine for these symptoms. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 344). She also testified that Davis had a 
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history of high blood pressure, and high cholesterol, and had an operation on his heart in 
1997, as well as, having his knees replaced in 1994. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 346). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RESPONDENT DID NOT WAIVE THE RIGHT 
FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INSTRUCT THE 
TRIAL COURT ON THE 4 YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD. 
1. Preservation. 
This issue was properly preserved because the trial court ruled on the statute 
of limitations issue stating that it was not a legitimate issue for the jury to consider. (Rec. 
798). Therefore, by ruling on the issue, the trial court demonstrated that the issue was 
brought to its attention; and thus, the issue was sufficiently preserved for review. Spears 
v. Wait. 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002).8 
2. Standard of Review. 
Whether the trial court applied the proper statute of limitations is a matter 
of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Lusk. 37 P.3d 1103 (Utah 2001). Whether the 
trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction constitutes error, is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Bluff, 52 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2002). In addition, whether 
furthermore, the issue was raised by Hatch on summary judgment (Rec. 281-454), 
which is sufficient to preserve it for review. Pierce v. Pierce, 994 P.2d 193 (Ut.App. 
2000). Hatch argued that the actions occurring more than 4 years ago should be excluded. 
Also to overcome summary judgment, Davis argued that whether there was a single act, 
or one continuing act, was a factual issue for the jury to decide. (Rec. 483-484) 
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a proposed jury instruction correctly states the law presents a question of law reviewed 
for correctness. M. at 1210; State v. Housekeeper. 62 P.3d 444 (Utah 2002). 
3. Relevant Law. 
This Court in Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 
(Utah 1992) in addressing the statute of limitations for infliction of emotional distress, 
after reviewing the legal claim of alienation of affection, stated as follows: 
Applying this standard by analogy, we hold that the statute of limitations for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress does not begin to run until the distress is 
actually inflicted, i.e., when the plaintiff suffers emotional distress.9 Id. at 975. 
This Court in Retherford also applied Utah's four-year limitation period, 
78-12-25(3) to the infliction of emotional distress claim. Id. at 975. This is the four year 
period relied upon by Hatch in his jury instruction.10 
Thus, the jury instruction proposed by Hatch is not clearly erroneous under 
the law. In addition, the Court of Appeals was well within its discretion to rule that the 
trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the four year limitation period for the 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Low v. City of Monticello, 45 P.3d 
1153 (Utah 2002); Busche v. Salt Lake County. 26 P.3d 862 (Ut.App. 2001). 
Davis claims that the trial court did not error in failing to instruct the jury on 
the four year limitation period; because the jury instruction proposed by Hatch, did not 
9This is the same statement in Hatch's Jury Instruction, which Davis claims is an 
incorrect statement of the law. See Davis's Brief page 25, footnote 13. 
10Davis claims that this 4-year period is an incorrect statement of the law. See 
Davis's Brief page 25, footnote 14. 
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account for the possibility of ongoing conduct. However, Davis never proposed an 
instruction accounting for the possibility of ongoing conduct; and therefore, Davis should 
not be able to raise this argument for the first time on appeal.11 State v. Archambeau. 820 
P.2d 920,922 (Ut.App. 1991). 
Perhaps most importantly, the continuing conduct theory was not the law 
according to this Court in Retherford. In Retherford, 844 P.2d 949, 976 footnote 18, this 
Court refused to adopt the theory of continuing violation, stating, "[although we do not 
at this time adopt their analysis, we note that courts facing similar difficulties in 
adjudicating Title VII claims, see 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, have enunciated a theory of 
continuing violation in order to allow plaintiff to recover for patterns of employment 
discrimination." 
This Court then went on to find, based on the facts in Retherford, that the 
plaintiff may have suffered emotional distress in September of 1985, when she took 
medical disability leave at the insistence of her psychiatrist. Thus, this Court noted, the 
emotional distress did not come into existence, as a matter of law, before September of 
1985; and is sufficient to raise a factual issue that the 4 year statute had not run by the 
time she filed her complaint in April of 1989. 
nThe trial court should have instructed the jury on the four-year limitation period; 
and if Davis wanted an instruction on possible continuing conduct, he is the one that 
should have raised it, not Hatch. 
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Most importantly, this Court in Retherford added, of course at trial 
defendants will have the opportunity to prove to the satisfaction of the finder of fact that 
the elements accrued some time before Retherford's leave of absence. However, on the 
facts before us we cannot say as a matter of law that it accrued before April of 1985. 
Therefore, this Court never held in Retherford that in situations of alleged ongoing and 
continued harassment, recovery is allowable so long as "one act of the violation occurs 
within the statute of limitation period."12 It was proper for the court to instruct the jury on 
the four year limitations period in Retherford. and the jury should have been so instructed 
in this case. 
The cases cited by Davis regarding the refusal of the trial court to give an 
erroneous jury instruction are inapposite to this case; and are clearly distinguishable by 
their facts, as they deal with instructions that are clearly erroneous and directly contrary to 
the law. For example, in State v. Bluff 52 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2002), the defendant wanted 
to instruct the jury that the mens rea for murder under the felony murder statute required 
an intent to commit murder, after this Court had clearly ruled that the mens rea required 
under the statute was only to commit the underlying felony. Id. at 1219. In State v. 
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 616 (UtApp. 1997), the defendant tried to claim the statutory 
justification defense, after this Court earlier rejected such a defense against a charge of 
resisting arrest. Id. at 616. These cases are far different than in this case, where this Court 
12If such is the case, why would the defendants in Retherford be given the 
opportunity to prove that the elements accrued some time before April of 1985. 
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in Retherford stated that the four year limitation period did apply; and that it was not 
adopting the continuing violation theory for infliction of emotional distress. 
Not only did the trial court fail to instruct the jury on the 4 year limitation 
period, as established by this Court in Retherford, but the trial court failed to instruct the 
jury on the continuing violation theory.13 Clearly the determination as to whether a 
separate act occurred or if it was part of a continuing violation is a factual question for the 
jury to decide. The trial court erred in taking upon itself the factual decision and ruling 
that since there was not a single act of outrageous conduct, but a practice of acts tolerable 
by themselves there was no legitimate issue for the jury to decide. (Rec. 798) The 
appellate court was proper in its review, under the correctness standard, to correct the trial 
court on this issue. 
4. Appellate Court Discretion. 
In reviewing a trial court's decision, the appellate court is given broad 
discretion and may affirm and rule upon any legal ground or theory appearing on the 
record, although the ground or theory was not presented or argued in the lower court. 
Low v. City of Monticello. 54 P.3d 1153 (Utah 2002); Busche v. Salt Lake County, 26 
P.3d 862 (Ut.App. 2001). It is also appropriate for the appellate court to rule on matters 
13As stated above the continuing violation theory would have been Davis's burden 
to propose; but even under that theory this Court required that three factors be considered 
(1) the subject matter, (2) the frequency and (3) the permanence. Retherford, at 976 ft. 
note 18. These factors were never presented to the jury, as the fact finder, and were not 
even considered or mentioned, by the trial court in its ruling. 
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which may become material when a case is remanded for further proceeding. Anderson 
v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979). See also 
State. In re S.A.v. State, 37 P.3d 1172 (Ut.App. 2001) (the appellate court has a duty to 
address issues that may rise again on remand). 
Given this Court's ruling that the four year limitation period is the proper 
one for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and the opportunity for a defendant to 
prove that the elements occurred before the four year limitation period; the appellate court 
was well within its discretion to find that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
on the four year statute of limitations period for Davis's claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
II THERE HAS BEEN NO EXCEPTION TO THE 
"PRESENCE REQUIREMENT" FOR INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, 
DEMONSTRATED IN THIS CASE. 
A. Standard of Review. 
A person claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress based on 
outrageous conduct directed towards another cannot recover unless that person is present 
at the time of the outrageous conduct.. A trial court's interpretation of law is reviewed for 
correctness. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 1162-63 (Utah 1993). 
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B. Relevant Law. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 46(b)(2) provides: 
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to 
liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress 
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family 
who is present at the time, whether or not such distress 
results in bodily harm, or 
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if 
such distress results in bodily harm. 
The courts have generally followed this "presence" requirement except in 
the most egregious of circumstances. Lund v. Caple. 675 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984) 
(husband who was not present when alleged outrageous conduct by pastor with husband's 
wife occurred, including sexual relations; did not establish necessary elements of tort 
directed to a third person); Lien v. Barnett, 794 P.2d 865 (Wash.App.Div.l 1990) 
(plaintiff could not maintain action for emotional distress, where pleadings indicated that 
such action occurred outside of his presence); Miles v. State Child Protective Services, 
Dept., 6 P.3d 112 (Wash.App.Div.2 2000) (plaintiff must be present when conduct 
occurred.). 
The purpose of the presence requirement is to put some limit on such 
liability to the plaintiffs who are present at the time, as distinguished from those who later 
discover what has occurred. Without such a limitation the number of persons who may 
suffer emotional distress is virtually unlimited. Restatement (Second) Torts, Section 46, 
Comment /. 
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C. Circumstances in this Case. 
In this case, Davis does not dispute that the alleged misconducted directed 
towards his wife took place outside of his presence. He argues instead that the 
Restatement leaves open the possibility of situations in which the presence requirement 
may not be required, referring to Comment I, Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 46. 
However, as analyzed by the Court of Appeals, such cases deal only with the 
circumstances of a loved one dying or being sexually assaulted. Under such egregious 
circumstances an exception may arise to the presence requirement. 
There is no such allegation of assault or physical abuse in this case. In fact, 
Davis's wife, to whom Davis claims the action was directed against, did not make any 
claims against Hatch, for assault, abuse, or infliction of emotional distress. This was also 
never alleged by Davis in his claims against Hatch. In Davis's claim for Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, he claims Hatch filed a lawsuit and demanded an investigation 
regarding Judith Davis's duties as Town Clerk,14 and wrote letters to the U.S. Postal 
Service regarding her duties as Postmistress. Hatch's questioning of Davis's wife 
concerning her duties as Town Clerk and as Postmistress for the Town of Boulder 
certainly does not rise to the level necessary to prove an exception to the "presence 
requirement" for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
14Hatch prevailed against the Town in his federal lawsuit; and at trial in this case 
the parties stipulated to the fact that Judith Davis made mistakes as the Town Clerk. 
(Trans. Vol. l,pg. 326) 
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Davis has failed to demonstrate that an exception to the presence 
requirement should have been recognized by the appellate court in this case. The 
appellate court's ruling in this regard should not be disturbed. 
D. There is no Presumption of the Verdict on Legal Issues. 
As stated above, the proper application of law is a question of law for the 
trial court, reviewed for correctness. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 1162-
63 (Utah 1993). Therefore, there is no presumption to be given to the jury's verdict on 
this legal issue; and Davis has failed to state any law in support of this argument. 
Davis claims that the court must assume that the verdict was supported by 
competent and sufficient evidence. However, Hatch is not challenging any factual 
finding by the court, but rather the application of law. The legal principal of the presence 
requirement to assert a claim for infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, Hatch is 
entitled to a complete review of such application by the appellate court, under the 
correctness standard, without any presumption in favor of the verdict.15 The appellate 
court properly reviewed this matter and found that the presence requirement should be 
applied in this case. Davis has failed to demonstrate that such a ruling is in error. The 
appellate court's ruling on this issue should not be disturbed. 
15Furthermore, such a presumption would not be proper since the trial court failed 
to follow the law in arriving at the verdict. 
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Ill A "WILLFUL ACT" WAS NOT PROPERLY PLED AS 
PART OF DAVIS'S CLAIM FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS. 
A. Standard of Review. 
Davis failed to state a claim for abuse of process as required under Utah 
law. A trial court's interpretation of the law is reviewed for correctness. Ledfors v. 
Emery County Sch. Dist. 849 P.2d 1162-63 (Utah 1993). 
B. Relevant Law. 
Abuse of process has two elements: "First, an ulterior purpose; second, an 
act in the use of the proceedings, not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings. 
Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, Paragraph 34. See also William Prosser, Law of 
Torts, Section 121, at 857 ("the essential elements of abuse of process . . . have been 
stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a willflil act in the use of the process 
not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding."). 
The mere filing of a lawsuit, even for an improper purpose, is insufficient 
for an abuse of process action, outside some definite act or threat not authorized by the 
process. Brown v. Kennard. 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891, 894 (Cal.Ct.App. 2001). The action 
must not be regular in the course of the proceeding. Id. A willful act for an abuse of 
process claim requires an overt act done in addition to the filing of a lawsuit. Meidinger 
v. Koniag Inc. 31 P.3d 77 (Alaska 2001); Vallance v. Brewbaker. 411 N.W.2d 808, 810 
(Mich.Ct.App. 1987). 
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C. Pleadings in this Case. 
In both his original and amended counterclaim, Davis's abuse of process 
claim was that Hatch's commencement of actions against him in federal and state court 
was ua perversion of the process in order to accomplish an improper purpose; that is, to 
intimidate the residents of the town as well as the town council to comply with Hatch's 
narrow and peculiar political and philosophical positions." 
D. No Allegation of a Willful Act. 
As the Court of Appeals ruled, it is clear that Davis has failed to plead any 
facts or make any allegation that Hatch engaged, "in an act in the use of the process not 
proper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding." Hatch v. Davis. 2004 UT App 378, 
Paragraph 36. 
Although Davis did allege an improper or ulterior motive or purpose for 
filing the actions against Davis, i.e., to intimidate, an "improper act may not be inferred 
from the motive." William Prosser, Law of Torts, Section 121, at 858; see also Keller v. 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker. 896 F. Supp 1563, 1571. Therefore, Davis failed to state an 
essential element for an abuse of process claim, that being some definite and overt act, 
outside the regular course of proceeding. Accordingly the trial court erred in failing to 
dismiss the abuse of process claim.16 
16Davis's claim that Hatch attempted to have him fired by the State Parks 
Commission or to have Ms. Davis removed as Postmistress for the Town, by writing to 
supervisors, does not help Davis since these allegations do not constitute any use of the 
civil process. 
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Furthermore, although Utah's has a liberal pleading requirement, Davis 
never amended his pleadings and never sought leave to amend his counterclaim for abuse 
of process, in order to include any further allegations or facts that would constitute a 
willful act for an abuse of process claim. Furthermore, since Davis never sought leave to 
amend at the trial court level, he is not allowed to make this argument for the first time on 
appeal State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Ut.App. 1991). Moreover, even if 
Davis did obtain leave to amend, Davis still fails to state any specific act conducted by 
Hatch, outside the regular course of the proceeding, that would constitute a willful act 
for an abuse of process claim.17 
E. No Presumption of Verdict on the Legal Issue. 
As stated above, the proper application of law is a question of law for the 
trial court and is reviewed for correctness. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 
1162-63 (Utah 1993). Therefore, there is no presumption to be given to the jury's verdict 
on this legal issue; and Davis has failed to state any law in support of this argument. 
Davis claims that the court must assume that the verdict was supported by 
competent and sufficient evidence. However, Hatch is not contesting any factual finding 
by the court on this issue; rather Hatch is contesting the application of law. The necessary 
17Rather, Davis continues to rely on the claim that Hatch was trying to intimidate or 
coerce Davis by filing suit. Again such allegations go towards motive, not to any specific 
act outside the regular course of proceeding; and an improper act cannot be inferred from 
improper motive. William Prosser, Law of Torts, Section 121, at 858; see also Keller v. 
Rav Ouinnev & Nebeker. 896 F. Supp 1563, 1571 
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elements to state a claim. Therefore, Hatch is entitled to a review of such application 
under the correctness standard, without any presumption in favor of the verdict. 
Given the allegations in Davis's counterclaim for abuse of process, it is 
clear that Davis has failed to allege a "willful act" outside the regular course of the 
proceeding, as part of his claim for abuse of process. This element properly limits the 
claim to instances where the process is abused outside its regular course of proceeding, 
not simply when a party filing may have an ulterior motive. This is why the courts have 
refused to imply an improper act from an ulterior motive.18 
This Court should not expand the requirements for an abuse of process 
claim to include such an implication, as argued by Davis; otherwise, any allegation made 
by a party that an action was commence for an improper purpose alone, i.e. to intimidate, 
would be sufficient to state a claim for abuse of process. In reality, such an unlimited 
expansion for an abuse of process claim in Utah, would result with every answer filed to 
now include a claim for abuse of process, simply by alleging an improper motive on the 
part of the claimant. 
The fact that Hatch sought money damages against Davis for assault and battery is not 
an ulterior motive, as such damages are allowed under the law. Furthermore, Hatch's claims 
were not simply frivolous claims to extort money. Even Judge McKiff at the end of the Hatch's 
case in chief, found probable cause and sufficient evidence on Hatch's claims to go to the jury. 
(Trans. Vol II, pg. 712). This finding was not appealed. 
Davis has failed to point to any case where abuse of process was found after a party's 
claims were found to have probable cause by the court; and the court found sufficient evidence to 
go to the jury on the factual issues. Such a ruling by this Court, under the circumstances of this 
case, would have disastrous results and would set an undesirable precedent, as any party who 
losses in court, even after a finding of probable cause by the court and a jury trial on the merits, 
would be liable for abuse of process. 
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CONCLUSION 
Hatch did not waive the right for the appellate court to rule that the jury 
should have been instructed that the statute of limitations for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is four years. This is a legal issue for the appellate court to decide, and 
the appellate court's ruling is consistent with this Court's ruling in Retherford and 
subsequent cases regarding the four-year limitation period for infliction of emotional 
distress claims. The jury instruction proposed by Hatch is also consistent with the four 
year limitation period, and is not so clearly erroneous under the law, that Hatch waived 
the right for the Court of Appeals to address this issue. 
The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that under the facts of this case an 
exception to the "presence requirement" should be recognized in order to allow Davis to 
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress for Hatch's complaints to his wife 
as Town Clerk and as Postmistress. This is further true, when Ms. Davis has not alleged 
any claims against Hatch on her own behalf for assault, battery or infliction of emotional 
distress. To recognize such a broad exception, as in this case, would open the door to an 
unlimited number of plaintiffs being able to claim emotional distress. 
The Petitioner has failed to state a claim for abuse of process and in his 
pleadings has failed to set forth any facts to allege a "willful act" outside the regular 
course of the civil proceedings. Petitioner's claim that the action was filed for an 
improper purpose, i.e. to intimidate, is not sufficient to allege a claim for abuse of 
process, without alleging a willful act outside the regular course of the proceeding. To 
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allow an abuse of process claim based solely on an alleged improper purpose or motive, 
would open to door for every answer filed, to contain a claim for abuse of process by 
merely alleging an improper motive on the part of the plaintiff. 
The appellate court properly determined these legal issues in reviewing the 
trial court's legal determinations on these issues. The decision issued by the Court of 
Appeals should fll be affirmed and not disturbed by this Court on review. 
DATED this J?I2Lday of June, 2005. 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
/tfudg^WJCaljr 
(^.ttofney for Respondent 
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